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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly assess the facts

of this case, and did the Court of Appeals apply the appropriate law
relevant to whether Mr. Grueber possessed standing to challenge the
seizure of the shotgun?

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized.

iv

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DARREN NEIL GRUEBER,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
Case No.
Priority No. 13

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 870532-CA
Priority No. 2

DARREN NEIL GRUEBER,
Defendant/Appellant.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals1 opinion in State v. Grueber, 110
Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah App. 1989) (Case No. 870532-CA, filed
June 2, 1989), is attached to this Petition as Appendix A.

On

June 16, 1989, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Rehearing in
the Court of Appeals.

On July 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied

Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.
the Court's order.

See Appendix B for a copy of

JURISDICTION
Following the Court of Appeals1 decision affirming
Mr. Grueber's conviction, a Petition for Rehearing was timely filed
with the Court of Appeals.

Pursuant to Rule 45(c) of the Rules of

the Utah Supreme Court, the filing of that Petition for Rehearing
tolled the time for filing the Writ of Certiorari until thirty days
following the denial of the Petition for Rehearing.

This Petition

for Writ of Certiorari therefore is timely filed in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

Jurisdiction is

bestowed on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (Supp.
1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Darren Neil Grueber appeals from a judgment and
conviction for Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended) following a
jury trial held August 11-12, 1987, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding.

The Utah Court of Appeals

affirmed that conviction in its decision dated March 21, 1989.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 7, 1986, police officer Scott Robinson of the
Murray City Police Department received word that a stolen welder was
being offered for sale by individuals in a green and white Chevrolet
van (R. 131 at 4-5). The license plate number of the van was
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provided to officers, who ran the plate through the Department of
Motor Vehicles learning that the van was registered to a Carolyn Ray
(R. 131 at 7, 13, 15). Officer Robinson went to the address listed
on the registration and waited for the van to return home (R. 131 at
7, 15).
A dispute exists as to what occurred next.

Officer

Robinson testified that when the van stopped, Mr. Grueber got out
immediately.and ran to the back of the house (R. 130 at 7 ) . Officer
Robinson testified that he yelled at Mr. Grueber to stop and that he
pursued Mr. Grueber around the side of the house until he
encountered a dog (R. 130 at 7-8). Mr. Grueber insists that he
stayed in the van for a while and then got out and walked to the
back of the house (R. 25-26).

Mr. Grueber claims that the officer

did not arrest him or order him to stay and that he walked away
because of a long-standing vendetta that the officer had against him
(R. 25-26).
In either event, Officer Robinson returned to the van and
ultimately arrested a passenger, Zane Jensen, on an outstanding
warrant charge (R. 130 at 55). Officer Robinson could see the
welder through the windows of the van and entered to check for the
serial number (R. 131 at 8 ) .
While looking for the serial number of the welder,
Officer Robinson saw a shotgun and two Halloween masks (R. 131 at
10-11).
19-20)).

(These events occurred within days of Halloween (R. 131 at
Carolyn Ray identified the shotgun as hers, but Officer

Robinson seized it anyway over her claims of legal ownership and
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protestations (R. 28-29, R. 131 at 18). Officer Robinson stated the
following reasons for seizing the shotgun and masks:

(1) he

believed the gun could have been stolen in conjunction with the
welder, and (2) he believed the gun and masks could possibly be
evidence used in a prior crime (R. 131 at 17-19).
Subsequently, charges were filed against Mr. Grueber for
an incident occurring August 13, 1986, roughly three months earlier,
wherein the complainant, Michael Wade, contended that Mr. Grueber
had shot at Mr. Wade while he drove in his van on the 1-15 freeway
near the 1-80 interchange (R. 130 at 20). Mr. Wade claimed that a
biker-type man had fired two shots at him from a green and white van
with a sawed-off shotgun because he had not driven up a freeway
on-ramp fast enough (R. 130 at 15). Mr. Wade had written down the
license plate of that van and filed a complaint the same day it
occurred, August 13, 1986 (R. 130 at 21, 29). The next day,
August 14, 1986, the case was assigned to Police Officer Richard
Mattingly, who then contacted Mr. Wade on August 15, 1986 (R. 130 at
56).
Three months later, after the incident with the welder
had occurred,1 photographs of Mr. Grueber and others were shown to
Mr. Wade.

He identified Mr. Grueber as the man who had shot at him

(R. 130 at 26, 30). Mr. Wade also identified the shotgun seized at
the welder incident as the gun which had been pointed at him (R. 130

1

Notably, no charges were ever filed against any party
in the welder incident despite Mr. Jensen's alleged confession
because of insufficient evidence to establish a crime (R. 130 at 9,
14).
- 4
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at 26).
Prior to his trial on Aggravated Assault charges,
Mr. Grueber moved to suppress the evidence of the shotgun and masks
cliaming they were seized in violation of his constitutional rights
(R. 131). That motion was denied (R. 63, R. 131 at 33) and the case
proceeded to trial (R. 130).
At trial, Mr. Grueber renewed his objection to the
admission of the shotgun into evidence (R. 130 at 60). The trial
court admitted the shotgun into evidence (R. 130 at 60-61)
consistent with its earlier ruling that (1) Mr. Grueber lacked
standing to challenge the seizure, (2) Mr. Grueber abandoned all
interest in the van and property when he ran (or walked) away, and
(3) the search was not intrusive and did not violate the law (R. 131
at 33) .
Notably, the trial court refused to hear evidence on the
question of the marital status of Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray and/or the
details of the extent of their relationship (R. 131 at 28-29, 31,
33).

The trial court ruled that guns were not marital property and

that Mr. Grueber could not object to the seizure of the weapon even
if married to Ms. Ray (R. 131 at 31-32).
The jury returned with a guilty verdict against
Mr. Grueber (R. 100). On appeal, Mr. Grueber challenged the trial
court's ruling on the seizure issue (Brief of Appellant at 11-19;
see Appendix C ) . The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling (see Appendix A) and subsequently denied a petition for
rehearing on this same issue (see Appendix B ) .
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Mr. Grueber now seeks relief before this Court on his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

ARGUMENT
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
MR. GRUEBER LACKED STANDING TO CHALLENGE AN
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND THE
LAW.
The panel of the Court of Appeals which heard this case
ruled that Mr. Grueber lacked standing to challenge the seizure of
the shotgun because he did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the van or the seized shotgun.
Utah Adv. Repc at 32.

State v. Grueber, 110

(See Appendix A ) . Importantly, the panel's

decision not only negatively affects Mr. Grueber's rights but
inappropriately establishes principles of standing which are
contrary to both the federal and state law defining standing.

This

Court should grant this petition to correct the error made below and
to clarify the doctrine of standing.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and its progeny espouse that
claimants of search and seizure violations must demonstrate a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place in order to
establish standing to challenge the violation,

jrd. at 143.

The

panel of the Court of Appeals which heard this case correctly noted
that this Court has adopted the Rakas standard as the proper test to
be applied when determining questions of standing.

110 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 31 (citing State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah
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1987)).
The Court of Appeal's legal analysis of the issue of
standing in this case consisted of listing the cases relied on by
the parties and indicating which group of cases was most similar to
the case at bar.

The cases relied on by the State were Rakas v.

Illinois; State v. Constantino; State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah
1984); and State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978).

These cases

all consist of non-owners of automobiles, either drivers or
passengers, who failed to claim proprietary or permissive possessory
interest in the vehicle and the items seized, or who actually denied
the same.

See the court's characterization of the cases at 110 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 31.
Mr. Grueber relied on cases where the facts established a
claim of interest either directly or from the factual circumstances
of permissive and/or regular use of the place searched.

Those cases

were listed as United States v. Jeffers,2 342 U.S. 48 (1951);
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987); and In re J.R.M.,
487 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. 1972) .
In analyzing the cases, the court placed too much
emphasis on the ownership question and too little importance on the
factual considerations which demonstrate the expectation of privacy

2

The Court of Appeals assigned United States v. Jeffers
as a case relied on by the Appellant. That claim is erroneous.
While Jeffers is of some help, Mr. Grueber did not cite Jeffers in
either his opening or reply brief. Nor did he elude to Jeffers at
oral argument. Rather, he relied on Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968), a case more on point and pertinent to this case.
See Appendix C, pp. 14-16.
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and the legitimacy of that expectation.
The Court of Appeals correctly indicated that the
expectation of privacy test is "fact sensitive" rather than
determined by a "bright line" standard.

110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31.

The court, however, then misconstrued and mischaracterized the facts
of this case and misinterpreted and misapplied the pertinent law of
standing achieving the erroneous result that Mr. Grueber lacked
standing to challenge the seizure of the shotgun because he did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van or the seized
shotgun.

110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32.
Factual errors of significance in the court's opinion are

as follows:
Mr. Grueber was not arrested on November 7, 1986, as
first suggested and then indicated by the court.
at 30.

110 Utah Adv. Rep.

The record reflects the arrest of Mr. Grueber did not occur

on that day but occurred sometime later (R. 130 at 55).
The court erroneously stated that the welder was
identified by the representative of the golf course prior to the
officer's entrance into the van to search for the identification
number.

110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30.

The record actually indicates

that Officer Robinson entered the van well before he contacted the
complainant (R. 131 at 11). While these first two factual errors
themselves do not impact on the issue of standing, these errors
demonstrate the court's erroneous reconstruction of the facts of
this case.
Most important for the fact sensitive issue of standing,
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the court unfairly minimized the relationship between Mr. Grueber
and Ms. Ray by calling her "defendant's girlfriend" and by asserting
as a "claim" and "allegation]" the fact that they lived together.
The court ignored critical uncontested facts to the contrary.

The

record reflects that Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray not only had lived
together for six years at the time of this incident (R. 130 at 112),
but that they also referred to themselves as husband and wife
(R. 25-29, 105) and together conceived and gave birth to three
children with a fourth child born after the trial (R. 130 at 107,
120).

Even the prosecutor acknowledged them as husband and wife

(R. 130 at 113). Accordingly, the facts support that much more than
a boyfriend-girlfriend relationshp existed between Mr. Grueber and
Ms. Ray and those facts belie the panel's characterization of a mere
claim or allegation that they lived together.
An important fact overlooked by the Court of Appeals'
panel is that the trial court's challenged ruling included a refusal
to hear evidence on the question of the marital status of
Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray and/or the critical details of the extent of
their relationship (R. 131 at 28-29, 31, 33). Therefore, when the
panel complains that Mr. Grueber cited no evidence to establish the
existence of such a relationship (110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32)—which
could have been most easily demonstrated by facts of living
arrangement and use of the van and/or the gun and other familial
manifestations and expectations of privacy—the court errs on two
counts.

First, the record does contain and suggest evidence of

their relationship and therefore Mr. Grueber's enhanced expectation
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of privacy and proprietary interests.

Second, Mr. Grueber should

not be penalized by the trial court's error to fail to allow that
information to be more fully established.

The appropriate remedy in

that instance would be to return the case to the trial court to hear
that evidence, not to deny standing because of its absence from the
record by result of the courtfs ruling.
The Court of Appeals1 panel mischaracterizes the facts
when stating "the van was parked in front of Ms. Ray's home."
Utah Adv. Rep. at 32.

110

Mr. Grueber lived there as well (R. 130 at

112) .
The court mischaracterizes the facts when stating
"defendant was not in the van when it was searched and the gun
seized."

110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. While technically correct,

Mr. Grueber had left the van mere moments earlier—and from the
drivers seat (R. 131 at 15-16).
The court's comment that "[t]here is no evidence in the
record establishing [Mr.] Grueber had Ms. Ray's permission to use
either the van or the gun at will, had a key to the van, or even how
often he had used either the van or the gun in the past" (110 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 32) is both incorrect and unfair.

The statement is

incorrect because, as the court itself acknowledged, Mr. Grueber was
driving the car when it pulled into the driveway (110 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 30) necessarily establishing permission to use the van—inasmuch
as Ms. Ray was with him—and further establishing his possession of
a key.

Additionally, while general at-will-use helps to establish

expectations of privacy, the facts show that on this occasion,
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Mr. Grueber had driven the car with permission and had parked in his
driveway establishing that he had standing to challenge the search
and seizure conducted immediately after he exited the car.

The

court's statement concluding a lack of evidence existed in the
record to support a finding of standing is unfair because, as
indicated above, the trial court refused to hear testimony on such
evidence (R. 131 at 28-33).
A final mischaracterization of a fact by the court
requires addressing.

The court states that Mr. Grueber did not know

the gun was present in the van.

110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32.

This

statement is correct (R. 130 at 134). However, the court's
implication that this fact more closely aligns his case to those
cases where defendants denied possessory and/or proprietary
interests in the vehicle or other articles seized is misplaced and
in error.

A critical distinction exists between someone who states,

"that briefcase is not mine," thereby denouncing any proprietary or
possessory interest (see State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah
1984)), and the case where Mr. Grueber states that he was unsure
whether the gun was in the van (R. 130 at 134). Mr. Grueber's
statement reveals nothing about his expectation of privacy from
police seizure of familial articles.
Notably, the court's conclusion that n[e]ven assuming the
existence of a [live-in] relationship . . . we find [Mr.] Grueber
did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van or the
seized shotgun" (110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32) seriously minimizes the
essential and critical facts.

Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray shared much

- 11 -

more than the "live-in relationship" as characterized by the court;
they were a functional family with shared familial interests.

Their

lack of legal marriage did not diminish any expectation of privacy
that they shared.

They (and others) recognized and treated

themselves as married—husband and wife, and father and mother of
their three children and the other children they raised together.
When this Court properly characterizes the facts, the
resulting legal analysis of the correct facts and state and federal
standing principles supports that the trial court and then the Court
of Appeals erred in finding that no standing existed for Mr. Grueber
to challenge the search and seizure of the van and gun.
In this case, the Court of Appeals emphasized the fourth
amendment differences between houses or apartments and automobiles.
110 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31.

While a less stringent warrant

requirement does exist between homes and cars, the cases which
explain those distinctions (see, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)) do not imply that any difference
in the requirements of standing exists among the search of a home,
an office, a telephone booth, or an automobile.

The standard in

each such locus is the legitimacy of the expectation of privacy, and
the test of legitimacy is still that standard announced in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), wherein the United States
Supreme Court held that the expectation must be one which society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.

See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448

U.S. 98, 104 (1980), citing Katz v. United States.
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It is reasonable for parties who share their lives, as
did Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray, to expect constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures of their home, automobile
and other property.

Mr. Grueber does not claim that, because of his

relationship with Ms. Ray, he has vicarious standing in property
identified as belonging to Ms. Ray.

Rather, he insists the nature

of the relationship results in a reasonable finding that society
will recognize that his expectations of privacy are warranted.
The facts of this case as now corrected present this
Court with enough information to find that Mr. Grueber possessed an
expectation of privacy in the van and in the gun despite the
respective registrations being listed only in the name of Ms. Ray.
A recent opinion from this Court supports Mr. Grueber's position.
In State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1986), this Court
found the appellant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy
because he failed to present evidence that he "shared ownership, use
or possession of the trailer."

In the instant case, the record does

support Mr. Grueber's claimed expectation of privacy.

His shared

use and possession is certainly established, even conceded.
Utah Adv. Rep. at 29-32.

110

While the trial court's ruling disallowing

the introduction of evidence of the relationship of Mr. Grueber and
Ms. Ray prevents Appellant from undisputably establishing that
actual ownership of the van and shotgun was shared, that inference
is factually supportable from the record.3

3 of note, Utah (society) recognizes the lifestyle of
Mr. Grueber and Ms. Ray to be akin to a legal marriage. See Utah
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1987).
- 13 -

Analyzing the cases cited in the briefs of both parties
now reveals Mr. Grueber more closely aligns with those cases finding
standing.

In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968),4 cited

by Mr. Grueber and unaddressed by the Court of Appeals, a grandson
was found to have standing to challenge a seizure of his
grandmother's rifle taken in a search of his grandmother's house
where he also lived because n[t]he rifle was used by all members of
the household and was found in the common part of the house."

Id.

at 548 n.ll.
The record in Mr. Grueber's case similarly supports that
the van was used by all members of the family—Mr. Grueber (R. 130
at 133), the children (R. 130 at 52), Ms. Ray (R. 131 at 7, 13, 16),
and Ms. Ray's mother (R. 130 at 121-22).

Notably, from the record

only Mr. Grueber is acknowledged as the driver of the van.

Nowhere

does the record reveal Ms. Ray or anyone else ever drove the van
even though it was registered in her name.

The gun, as in Bumper,

was also found in a general location common to all in the family and
in no way excluded Mr. Grueber's interest in it.
Other critical facts appearing in his case and those
cases where standing was found are as follows:
in Mr. Grueber's driveway.

The car was parked

He had just vacated the van after

driving it under circumstances demanding an inference that his
driving was with the registered owner's permission; she was with him

4

Bumper v. North Carolina is cited in Rakas v. Illinois
as still viable and distinct from Rakas itself (as is Mr. Grueber's
case). See Brief of Appellant at 14-16 found in Appendix C.
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in the van.
1988).
keys.

See Munson v. State, 748 P.2d 324, 334 (Okla. Crim.

By driving the car, he necessarily had possession of the
See People v. Tufts, 717 P.2d 485, 490-91 (Colo. 1986).
Additionally, Mr. Grueber reiterates that those cases

relied on by the State, and subsequently by the Court of Appeals,
are inapposite to his facts.

Mr. Grueber was not a passenger in the

van nor did he ever claim to not have an interest in the van or the
gun.

Rather, unlike those other defendants, he remained consistent

in his assertion of standing to challenge the unlawful seizure.

Cf.

Rakas v. Illinois; State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987);
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984).
The corrected facts of this case establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the van and its possessions, including the
gun.

This Court should now find standing to be met and then reach

the issue that the gun was seized contrary to the law outlined by
the plain view search exception to the warrant requirement.

See

Brief of Appellant at 11-19, attached as Appendix C.
Alternatively, Mr. Grueber urges that inasmuch as the
trial court did not permit evidence to be introduced on the issue
that the Court of Appeals deemed so critical to its assessment of
whether standing existed, he requests the case be remanded to the
trial court where he can establish in more detail the nature of his
relationship with Ms. Ray and his interests in the van and the gun.
Finally, Mr. Grueber notes that rejecting his petition
would allow a decision to stand which seriously jeopardizes the
rights of accused persons to challenge the legality of searches and
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seizures of automobiles they may drive which are not registered in
their names.

The current opinion, if allowed to stand, will

negatively impact on too many of our citizens.

Once a police

officer discovers that the driver of an automobile is not the
registered owner, the opinion from the Court of Appeals permits the
officer to seize and search the vehicle without considerations of
basic rights of privacy against unreasonable police intrusion.

In

effect, once the officer discovers that a non-owner is driving the
car, without more, this decision gives him carte blanche to search
and seize with impunity.

The current opinion too narrowly

constricts our rights as citizens, and Mr. Grueber urges this Court
to grant his petition to correct this diminution of critical and
historic rights.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Grueber respectfully requests that this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari be granted and that this Court review the issues
addressed herein.
tis
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underlying the original award.
We have examined the trial court's comments from the bench in the modification
hearing, and have found little explanation as
to the reasoning behind the denial of LaRae's
petition. The hearing transcript reveals that
keeping the children together was one reason
for awarding initial custody to the father, but
there is nothing to indicate why the court
dispensed with that objective in awarding
custody of only the older children to LaRae.
The trial court's initial custody award
appears to have been properly premised on the
"best interests" standard of Utah Code Ann.
§30-3-10 (1989). The initial decree does
not, however, discuss the underlying factual
basis for the decision. The court merely concluded that Raymond was "a proper parent to
be awarded the care, custody and control of
the minor children." The original decree thus
provides no baseline analysis of the relevant
factors for the award of custody to Raymond
against which the claimed change of circumstances can be measured.2 Because there is
simply insufficient factual grounds expressed
to conclude whether a change of circumstances
has been demonstrated, we are compelled to
remand the case to the trial court for entry of
appropriate findings.3 Those findings should
articulate the considerations behind the initial
award of custody and the order denying
modification, and should reflect the current
legal standard for modification of custody.4
The order denying LaRae's petition to
modify custody of the two youngest children is
vacated and the case is remanded for entry of
appropriate findings.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Neither party challenges the custody award of the
older children.
2. Those relevant factors may include: the preference of the children; keeping siblings together; the
relative strength of the children's bonds with one or
both of the prospective custodians; the general interest in continuing previously determined custody
arrangements where the children are happy and welladjusted; the prospective custodian's moral character, emotional stability, and duration and depth of
desire for custody; the ability to provide personal
rather than surrogate care; significant impairment of
ability to function as a parent through drug abuse,
excessive drinking, etc.; the reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; the prospective custodian's religious compatibility with the children;
kinship, which may include stepparent status; and
the financial condition of the prospective custodian.
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
1982).
3. Without such findings, for example, it is difficult
to distinguish Raymond's voluntary relinquishment
of custody to LaRae from the situation in Tuckey v.
T\,„ir..„ AAO P ->H as mtah iQjm frhanoe of circu-

mstances shown where mother is temporarily absent
from state, leaving custody of children with grandparents).
4. LaRae contends on appeal that she has demonstrated a sufficient change of circumstances to justify
a modification of custody. Since we do not reach
this issue, we have no occasion to consider whether
the trial court correctly applied the legal standard as
set forth in Elmer v. Elmer, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 37,
39-41 (1989); see also Maughan, 770 P.2d at 15961.
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OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Darren Neil Grueber ("Grueber")
was convicted of aggravated assault, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-103 (1978). Grueber appeals from
his conviction claiming: (1) a shotgun seized
during a warrantless search should have been
suppressed; (2) he was prejudiced by the
State's failure to produce requested information during discovery; (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (4) there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
We affirm.
FACTS
On August 13, 1986, Michael Wade was
driving his automobile southbound onto the I15 on-ramp near 13th South in Salt Lake
City, Utah. A green and white Ford van
pulled up beside Mr. Wade in the right-hand
lane of the on-ramp. The driver of the van
yelled at Mr. Wade for not driving fast
enough and attempted to force Mr. Wade's
automobile off the road. The two vehicles
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proceeded side by side up the ramp for a
sufficient length of time for Mr. Wade to view
the driver of the van.
After merging onto the interstate, Mr. Wade
was still traveling next to the green and white
van. At this time, he observed a woman passenger in the van pointing a shotgun at him.
Mr. Wade quicky applied his brakes and
positioned his automobile directly behind the
green and white van* From this vantage point,
Mr0 Wade observed the van's license plate
number (674 ALH) and other identifiable
features. As the vehicles approached the 1-80
interchange, Mr. Wade veered to the far left
lane and fled toward the 1-80 entrance. At
this time, Mr. Wade observed a shotgun sticking out of the driver's window of the green
and white van, observed a large tattoo on the
driver's upper arm and heard shotgun blasts.
From these events, Mr. Wade concluded the
driver of the van had fired two shots at his
automobile. The shotgun blasts neither
damaged his automobile nor injured the occupants.
The green and white van did not follow Mr.
Wade as he entered the 1-80 interchange. Mr.
Wade exited 1-80 and went directly to the
South Salt Lake Police Department. He reported the incident and his observations to the
police, including the van's license plate
number. A registration check disclosed
Carolyn Ray as the owner of the van.
On October 14, 1986, Mr. Wade viewed a
number of photos from which he positively
identified Grueber as the person who fired the
shotgun at him.
In a separate incident, on November 7,
1986, Officer Scott Robinson of the Murray
City Police Department was informed the
occupants of a green and white van, license
plate number 674 ALH, had attempted to sell
a welder which the police had reason to
believe had been stolen during a recent burglary at the Murray City Golf Course. Officer
Robinson requested a registration check which
again revealed Carolyn Ray as the owner of
the van. Officer Robinson then proceeded to
the address listed on the registration, and
waited for the van's arrival. When the van
entered the driveway, Officer Robinson exited
his car and identified himself as a police
officer. As he approached the van, Officer
Robinson observed the driver get out of the
van and run to the back of the house. Officer
Robinson followed the driver, but his pursuit
was impeded by a dog tied to the side of the
house. The driver was later apprehended by
Officer Robinson and identified as the defendant, Grueber.
Officer Robinson returned to the van after
encountering the dog and observed Carolyn
Ray, several children, and an adult male
exiting the van. Through the windows of the
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Soon thereafter, a representative of the golf
course arrived and positively identified the
welder in the van as the welder stolen from the
Murray City Golf Course. Officer Robinson
then entered the van and attempted to locate
the serial number on the welder. Once inside,
Officer Robinson saw a shotgun with a pistol
grip situated near the driver's seat, partially
covered but in plain view.
Officer Robinson ran a check for warrants
on Grueber. The check showed a warrant for
aggravated assault from Sandy City and
another warrant from Salt Lake City. Officer
Robinson seized the welder, the shotgun, and
some Halloween masks from the van and
arrested Grueber.
A hearing was held prior to trial on
Grueber's motion to suppress the shotgun
from evidence and Grueber renewed his objection at trial. Officer Robinson articulated
three reasons for seizing the shotgun: (1) the
gun was present with other stolen property; (2)
the driver, with an outstanding warrant for
aggravated assault, had fled the scene and thus
the officer believed the gun could have been
used in the prior crime; (3) the Halloween
masks were present with the weapon, indicating a criminal purpose for the presence of the
gun. The trial court denied Grueber's motion,
finding Grueber did not have standing to
object to the seizure of the gun and that the
seizure was proper.
At trial, Officer Richard Mattingly, a
witness for the State, utilized notes during his
direct examination which had not been provided to the prosecution, and consequently, had
not been furnished to defense counsel, though
the notes were covered by a defense discovery
request. Defendant filed a motion for a mistrial claiming he was prejudiced by the late
disclosure of these police reports and notes.
The trial court allowed defense counsel additional time to examine ihe notes and prepare
for his cross-examination of Officer Mattingly. As a result, the trial was recessed for 24
hours. The court also required the State to
recall any prior witnesses, including Mr.
Wade, if defense counsel wished to reexamine the witnesses in light of the newly
discovered notes. However, the court denied
Grueber's motion for a mistrial finding: (1)
the discovery violation was discovered prior to
the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief
and therefore, any prejudice was cured; (2) the
information in the notes was inculpatory in
nature and since neither party obtained the
notes prior to trial, their unavailability was
probably, on the whole, beneficial to Grueber;
and (3) any possible prejudice would be prevented or mitigated by giving defense counsel
adequate time to prepare for and incorporate
into their trial strategy any new information.
Subsequently, Grueber was convicted of
aoarsvafed assault under Utah Code Ann.
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SUPPRESSION OF THE SHOTGUN
Grueber argues the shotgun seized from the
green and white van should not have been
allowed into evidence. Although Grueber
concedes the shotgun was in plain view when
seized, he claims the shotgun was not clearly
incriminating and the officer did not have
probable cause to believe it was connected to
any criminal activity.
The State argues Grueber had no expectation of privacy in the van or the gun, and thus
he does not have standing to object to the
seizure of the gun. The State further argues
that even if Grueber could object to the
seizure, the police officer had probable cause
to seize the gun since it was clearly incriminating. We do not reach the issue of whether
the gun found in plain view during an otherwise proper search was properly seized as
clearly incriminating since we agree that
Grueber did not have an expectation of
privacy in the van or the gun, and thus cannot
complain of the seizure.
The concept of standing is not "theoretically
separate" under the fourth amendment. Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139, 99 S. Ct. 421,
428, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). The proper test,
which implicitly incorporates the concept of
standing, is whether the person who claims the
protection of the fourth amendment "has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place." Id. at 143, 99 S. Ct. at 430. See
also State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125,
126-27 (Utah 1987); State v. Larocco, 742
P.2d 89, 91 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that an expectation of
privacy in an automobile is different from an
expectation of privacy in one's residence. "We
have on numerous occasions pointed out that
cars are not to be treated identically with
h o u s e s or [ a j p a r t m e n t s for
[f]ourth
[a]mendment purposes." Rakas, 439 U.S. at
148, 99 S. Ct. at 433 (citing United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S. Ct. 2476,
2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.
Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S. Ct.
2464, 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974)).
The legitimate expectation of privacy test is
not a "bright line" test but is fact sensitive.
Therefore, in order to determine whether
Grueber had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the van or the gun, we compare the
facts before us with the facts in other similar
cases.
The State relies on, among others, the following cases to assert Grueber had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the green and
white van at the time the shotgun was seized
from it: Rakas; Constantino; State v. Valdez,
689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984); State v. Purcell,
586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978).

In Rakas, police stopped a van they suspected to be the get-away car in a recent
robbery. The defendants were passengers in
the car which the owner was driving. The
police searched the car and found a box of
rifle shells in the glove compartment and a
sawed-off rifle under the front passenger
seat. Defendants were arrested. The Court
held the defendants, as occupants of the van,
had neither a proprietary nor a possessory
interest in the automobile, nor an interest in
the property seized. 439 U.S. at 148. Although
the defendants were in the car with the permission of the owner, the Court found they
did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the particular areas of the automobile which the police searched. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the
Rakas analysis in at least three of its decisions.
In Stare v. Constantino, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute after an inventory
search of the car he was driving disclosed two
plastic bags containing marijuana. A police
investigation revealed the car that defendant
was driving was registered to another person.
Defendant did not claim he had driven the car
with the permission of the owner or that he
had borrowed the car under circumstances that
would imply permissive use. 732 P.2d at 127.
The court held that "[ajbsent claimed right to
possession, [defendantl could not assert any
expectation of privacy in the items seized and
had no standing to object to the search." Id.
In Srare v. Valdez, defendant was arrested
for producing a driver's license with a false
name following a stop by police officers who
noticed that defendant's car had no front
license plate. Defendant told police officers
that he did not own the car. The officers
searched the car without obtaining a warrant
and discovered an attache case in the trunk
which was closed but contained a check that
partially protruded from the case. The officers
opened the case and discovered certain items
of false identification. Because defendant
conceded that he did not own the car or
attache case containing the evidence complained of, the Utah Supreme Court held that he
did not have any legitimate expectation of
privacy in the effects searched. 689 P.2d at
1335. Accord State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d at
443.
Grueber argues the following cases support
his claim that he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the van: United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59
(1951); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); In re J.R.M., 487 S.W.2d 502
(Mo. 1972)(en banc).
In United States v. Jeffers, the Supreme
Court held the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his aunt's hotel
room where the defendant had been given a
I key to the hotel room, had the occupant's
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permission to use the room at will, and often
entered the room for various purposes. 342
U.S. at 50-52.
In State v. Larocco, this court held the
defendant had standing to challenge the legality of the search of a van which the police
subsequently determined was stolen. At the
time of the search, the van was registered in
the defendant's name, was parked in front of
his home, and had been used exclusively by
the defendant as the asserted owner and by no
one else for an extended period of time. 742
P.2dat92.
Grueber also relies on In re J.R.M., wherein
the Missouri Supreme Court held that a juvenile had standing to challenge the warrantless
search of an automobile even though he was
not the record owner of the van, and was not
on the premises at the time of the search. The
evidence showed the juvenile had his own key
to the car, had the right to use the car at any
time, regularly drove the car to school, used
the car as much as he would have if the title
had been in his name, was included as an
insured driver under the automobile insurance
policy on the car, and lived with his parents
where the car was kept. 487 S. W.2d at 509.
We believe the facts presented in this case
are closer to the cases cited by the State where
courts have found a nonowner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile.
In the instant case, the seized shotgun was
owned by and registered to defendant's girlfriend, Carolyn Ray. Similarly, Ms. Ray was
the registered owner of the green and white
van. Although the van was parked in front of
Ms. Ray's home at the time of the search and
defendant claimed he lived with Ms. Ray,
defendant was not in the van when it was
searched and the gun seized. At the time the
gun was seized, Grueber stated he did not even
know the gun was in the van.
There is no evidence in the record establishing Grueber had Ms. Ray's permission to use
either the van or the gun at will, had a key to
the van, or even how often he had used either
the van or the gun in the past. Grueber cites
no facts which other courts have found relevant to demonstrate a nonowner had a possessory or proprietary interest in an automobile. Grueber merely relies on his alleged livein relationship with Ms. Ray to claim a
privacy interest in the van and gun. Even
assuming the existence of such a relationship,
under the facts in the record, we find Grueber
did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the van or the seized shotgun.

he was prejudiced because had he known the
contents of the additional reports he would
not have impeached Mr. Wade on crossexamination as to certain facts testified to but
not appearing in any police report. These facts
included that the shotgun used in the alleged
assault did not have a stock but had a strap,
and that there was a "Harley-Davidson"
sticker on the back of the van driven by
Grueber.
A trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial should not be upset unless it clearly
appears the trial court abused its discretion. See
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah
1988); State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390
(Utah 1977); Stare v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367,
517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974). See also State v.
Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 818 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-30(a) (1982)
provides "(a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded." In State
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), the
Utah Supreme Court stated,
[w]e have ruled in several cases that
the Rule 30 phrase "affect the substantial rights of a party" means
that an error warrants reversal
"only if a review of the record
persuades the court that without the
error there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result
for the defendant.'"
Id. at 919 (quoting Stare v. Fontana, 680 P.2d
1040, 1048 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in original)).
The Knight court provided further guidance by
defining what is meant by a "reasonable likelihood." "For an error to require reversal, the
likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
the verdict." 734 P.2d at 920.
We are not convinced the impeachment of
Mr. Wade on minor questions concerning the
identification of the gun and van because such
information was not contained in Officer
Mattingly's partial report affected the
"substantial rights" of the defendant. We
conclude there is not a reasonable likelihood
the trial outcome would have been more favorable to Grueber if Grueber had received the
materials used by Officer Mattingly, prior to
trial, and had therefore, conducted his crossexamination of Mr. Wade in a different
manner. Cf. State v. Schreuder, 111 P.2d 264,
276 (Utah 1985); Srare v. Carter, 707 P.2d
656, 661-62 (Utah 1985).

DISCOVERY VIOLATION
Grueber next argues the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial after Officer
Mattingly relied on reports and notes during
his direct examination which had been requested by, but not furnished to, defense counsel

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
During direct examination, Grueber was
asked by his attorney if he had been convicted
of a felony. Grueber responded that he had
been convicted of distribution of marijuana in
1980. Upon further questioning, Grueber also
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admitted that in 1978, at the age of 17, he had
been convicted of joy-riding, a misdemeanor.
Grueber claims these convictions were properly
excludable under Utah R. Evid. 609 and thus
his counsel's performance was constitutionally
defective.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, Grueber must meet the elements of a
two-prong test.
First, the defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. Second,
the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing
that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the twoprong Strickland standard in State v. Frame,
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
The mere fact that defendant received an
unfavorable result does not give rise to the
conclusion that defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., State v. Buel,
700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985). If the defendant fails to make the required showing of
either deficient performance on counsel's part
or of sufficient prejudice as a result of
counsel's error, then defendant's ineffectiveness claim is defeated. See, e.g., State v.
Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).
To establish prejudice,
[i]t is not enough to claim that the
alleged errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome or could have
had a prejudicial effect on the fact
finders. To be found sufficiently
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively show that a "reasonable
probability" exists that, but for
counsel's error, the result would
have been different. We have
defined "reasonable probability" as
that sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the
verdict.
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Accord State v.
Archuletta, 141 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987).
In the instant case, we need not address
whether counsel's questioning of Grueber
about his prior convictions was deficient performance,1 as we find Grueber has not met his
burden of showing that the introduction of his
prior convictions into evidence was prejudicial.
In effect, Grueber has failed to show that but
for his counsel's alleged deficiencies, there
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exists any "reasonable probability" that the
jury's verdict would have been different.
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987),
where the court found that counsel's failure to
exclude prior convictions was reversible error.
In Gentry, the defendant did not take the
stand because of the admission of his prior
convictions. The Gentry court was persuaded
there was a reasonable likelihood that the
result would have been different because the
court could only speculate as to what defendant's testimony might have been and its
effect upon the outcome of the trial. Id. at
1038. In the instant case, Grueber took the
stand and the evidence received during trial
against him was convincing independent of the
admission of prior convictions that had attenuated relevance to the crime charged.
Rather, this case is comparable to Hoeck v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 698 P.2d 666
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985), where defendant's
trial counsel conceded that defendant had five
prior "driving while intoxicated" convictions
and four prior "driving with license revoked"
convictions. The court held that such a concession did not amount to ineffective assistance
of counsel. Id. at 668. Accord Stevens v.
State, 540 P.2d 1199 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
Because Grueber failed to show the introduction into evidence of his prior convictions
was prejudicial to the outcome of the trial,
Grueber's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must fail.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Grueber's final claim is that insufficient
evidence existed to support his aggravated
assault conviction. We disagree.
In considering a sufficiency of the evidence
question, we will review the evidence and all
inferences reasonably drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict. State
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). We
will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when that evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id.
See also State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 1029, 1030
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Grueber does not claim there was insufficient evidence to support the elements of aggravated assault but simply claims the assault
victim, Mr. Wade, was not credible. This
court will not second guess the determinations
of the fact finder as to witness credibility, and
based on the record before us the evidence is
not "'sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or
shel was convicted.'" Sfare v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 124 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Petree,
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659 P.2d at 444). Thus, we find that there was
sufficient evidence upon which to base
OPINION
Grueber's aggravated assault conviction.
BILLINGS, Judge:
CONCLUSION
Petitioner Grace Drilling Company appeals
In summary, we find the trial court properly
from
the decision of the Board of Review of
denied Grueber's motion to suppress the
the
Industrial
Commission ("Board") awarding
shotgun from evidence because Grueber did
Gordon
E.
Goodale
unemployment compensnot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the van searched or the gun seized,, We further ation benefits. The Board concluded Mr.
find Grueber was not prejudiced by the Goodale was not discharged from his emploState's discovery violation since there is not a yment for disqualifying conduct under Utah
reasonable likelihood that the trial outcome Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1) (1988). We
would have been different in the absence of affirm the Board's determination.
the violation. Additionally, Grueber did not
FACTS
receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to
We review only those facts relevant to the
counsel's introduction of prior convictions issues presented. In January 1988, Mr.
because Grueber failed to show this prejudiced "Goodale was hired by Grace Drilling to work
the outcome of his trial. Finally, we find there as a foreman on two of its oil drilling rigs in
was sufficient evidence to support Grueber's Uintah County, Utah. As a condition of
assault conviction.
employment, Mr. Goodale agreed to abide by
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm.
Grace Drilling's safety manual, work rules,
and regulations. Mr. Goodale also consented
Judith M. Billings, Judge
to submit to random drug testing. Both Grace
WE CONCUR:
Drilling's safety manual and the consent
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
forms signed by Mr. Goodale clearly stated
Russell W. Bench, Judge
that testing positive on a drug screen while on
duty was cause for discharge. Mr. Goodale
1. Counsel did make a successful motion in limine acknowledged that he had read and understo exclude testimony as to an alleged assault with a tood the manual, drug policy, and consent
machete committed by defendant. This is some evi- form.
dence that counsel's choice not to dispute the
While at work on March 17, 1988, Mr.
admissibility of the less prejudicial convictions was
Goodale was randomly selected for drug
merely trial strategy.
testing. He voluntarily submitted a urine
sample and executed another consent form.
On the form, Mr. Goodale disclosed that he
had been taking Advil within the past seven
Cite as
days.
Mr. Goodale also verbally informed his
110 Utah Adv. Rep. 34
supervisor that he had been taking two prescription drugs for lower back pain, the names
IN THE
of which he could not recall. He offered to go
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
home to retrieve the names of the drugs, but
Mr. Goodale's supervisor informed him that it
GRACE DRILLING COMPANY,
was unnecessary. Instead, the supervisor infPetitioner,
ormed Mr. Goodale that if the test results
v.
were positive, he would be given an opportuBOARD OF REVIEW of the Industrial
nity to present the names of the other two
Commission of Utah, Department of
drugs for Grace Drilling to consider. The drug
Employment Security, and Gordon E.
test was conducted and Mr. Goodale's urine
Goodale,
sample tested positive for marijuana. Mr.
Respondents.
Goodale was discharged on March 24, 1988,
without being given an opportunity to provide
No. 880572-CA
the names of the two prescription drugs he
FILED: June 2, 1989
told his supervisor he had been using prior to
the drug test.
Original Proceeding in this Court.
Mr. Goodale filed for and was awarded
ATTORNEYS:
unemployment benefits. Grace Drilling appeFrederick M. MacDonald, Salt Lake City, for
aled the Department of Employment SecuPetitioner
rity's initial determination by notice dated
R. Paul Van Dam and Alan Hennebold, Salt
May 12, 1988. At the administrative hearing,
Grace Drilling's representative had no persLake City, for Respondents
onal knowledge of Mr. Goodale's drug test or
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Jackson.
the circumstances surrounding his discharge.
Furthermore, the written test results were not
offered into evidence, and Grace Drilling
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

ORDER

v.

Case No-

870532-CA

Darren Neil Grueber,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for
Rehearing filed by the Appellant.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this 7th day of July, 1989.
FOR THE COURT:

(QMl^

Mary T/ NOonan
Clerk yt)f the Court

APPENDIX C

Copied portion of Appellant's Opening Brief

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
DENYING MR. GRUEBER'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
SHOTGUN FROM ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE,
In response to discovery motions, the prosecution
indicated the intent to introduce a shotgun into evidence at
Mr. Grueber's trial (R. 21-22).

Prior to trial/ defense counsel

moved to have that evidence suppressed (R. 30-37/ R. 131 at 1-33.
See Addendum A for memorandum in support of that motion.).
motion was denied by the Court (R. 63/ R. 131 at 33) and the
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That

shotgun was admitted over the renewed objection of defense counsel
at trial (R. 130 at 60). Mr. Grueber insists that the Court's
ruling was erroneous and prejudicial.
On November 7, 1986, Murray City Police Officer Scott
Robinson received information that individuals in a green and white
van had attempted to sell a welder believed to be stolen (R. 131 at
5).

The officer confirmed a welder had been stolen and then ran a

check on the license number of the green and white van (R. 131 at
6).

The officer testified at the suppression hearing that after the

van arrived home, he got out of his car and Mr. Grueber, who had
been driving, jumped out of the van and ran behind the house (R. 131
at 7 ) . The officer further testified that Mr. Grueber was not under
arrest but that he did tell Mr. Grueber to stop (R. 131 at 15). The
officer testified that he pursued Mr. Grueber until he encountered a
dog on the side of the house (R. 131 at 7-8).
Mr. Grueber disputes that he ran from the officer and
insists that the officer did not order him to stay or tell him that
he was arrested (R. 25-26).

Mr. Grueber claims to have walked away

because of a long-standing vendetta that the officer appears to have
against him (R. 26).
The officer returned to the van and inter alia spotted a
welder inside (R. 131 at 8 ) . He then entered the van to look for an
identification number (R. 131 at 10). While inside the van, the
officer saw a shotgun and some Halloween masks—Halloween having
occurred just days prior (R. 131 at 12). The officer then seized
the gun and masks as evidence taken in conjunction with other
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stolen property (presumably the welder) over the protestations of
the declared legal owner of the gun, Ms. Carolyn Ray (R. 131 at 13/
16, 23; R. 28-29).
Officer Robinson testified at the suppression hearing
that he seized the gun because (1) he believed it could have been
stolen in conjunction with the welder (R. 131 at 17-18), and (2) he
believed that the combination of the gun and Halloween masks "could
possibly be some type of evidence used in a previous crime" (R. 131
at 1 9 ) . 2
Following the testimony of Officer Robinson, counsel for
Mr. Grueber moved to suppress the shotgun because the officer lacked
the requisite probable cause to believe the gun had been involved in
criminality (R. 131 at 23). The prosecutor answered by stating
that:

(1) because the shotgun belonged to Ms. Ray, Mr. Grueber had

no standing to challenge the seizure; (2) when Mr. Grueber got out
of the van and ran (or walked) away, he abandoned all interest in
the property within it; and (3) the search (not the seizure) was
unobtrusive and permissible under current case law (R. 131 at

2

The Court also asked several questions of Officer
Robinson and by leading him, elicited a third reason. The Court
asked him, "Was the fact that there was an outstanding warrant for
aggravated assault, although you did not know the nature of whatever
was involved in that assault, was that a factor in your decision to
seize that gun?" The officer answered, "I believe it was." (R. 131
at 21.) Defense counsel objected to the leading nature of the
question and pointed out he had not given that answer before (R. 131
at 22). This third reason should not factor into this Court's
assessment of this issue for that reason. Mr. Grueber insists,
however, that the officer's lack of knowledge regarding the details
of the outstanding warrant negates reliance on this rationale to
support a seizure of the shotgun for the same reasons the other two
fail.
- 13 -

23-26).

Counsel for Mr. Grueber conceded the search was not an

issue but argued that the seizure was unlawful and further protested
that standing existed through the relationship Mr. Grueber had with
the automobile and with Ms. Ray including a six-year status as
common law spouse and father of several children with Ms. Ray
(R. 130 at 112, 120).
The Court ultimately held for the State, finding that
Mr. Grueber lacked standing, that he abandoned the property, and
that the seizure was otherwise justified (R. 131 at 33).
The question of standing has been resolved by the United
States Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 123 (1978).

The

standard announced in Rakas is that standing to object to a Fourth
Amendment violation hinges on "whether the person who claims
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the invaded space."

439 U.S. at 143.

Notably, the Rakas court upheld an earlier decision,
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), which demonstrates
the error by the trial court in this case.
In Bumper, the appellant lived with his grandmother in
her home.

He challenged the search and seizure of his grandmother's

rifle found in the house as violative of his own Fourth Amendment
rights.

The Court found that there could be no serious question as

to the grandson's right to challenge the search, indicating that
"[t]he rifle was used by all members of the household and was found
in the common part of the house."

391 U.S. at 548 n.ll.

Rakas

reaffirmed Bumper as good law, acknowledging that the defendant in
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Bumper "had a substantial possessory interest in both the house
search and the rifle seized."

439 U.S. at 136.

Ownership is

therefore not the talisman to standing.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Rakas opinion and
rationale, having discussed the question of standing in several
cases.

In State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334-35 (Utah 1984), the Court

found that the accused lacked standing because he disclaimed
ownership in both the car and the attache case at issue and
concomitantly because he failed to show that he had any legitimate
expectation of privacy.

In State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125,

126-27 (atah 1987), the atah Supreme Court again found no standing
because the defendant driver of another's car failed to offer
evidence that he either had permissive use of the car or had the car
under circumstances which could imply permissive use.
This Court has also reviewed the doctrine of standing,
noting that:
In each Otah case where the search was upheld it
was clearly established and not disputed prior to
the search that defendant did not own or did not
have an interest in the property searched. These
cases are distinguishable from those where
defendant asserts ownership of the property, or
otherwise an interest giving rise to a "legitimate
expectation of privacy." We agree with the
reasoning in State v. Constantino, that there must
be at least a claimed right to possession in the
property.
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 92 (atah App. 1987) cert, granted
(1/26/88).

What was absent in State v. Valdez and State v.

Constantino appears in State v. Larocco where the car in question
was parked in front of the accused's house and registered in his
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name.

_Id.

The instant case is also distinguishable from State v.

Valdez and State v, Constantino and is aligned more closely with
State v, Larocco and Bumper v. North Carolina where standing was
held to have existed..

Standing exists for Mr. Grueber because he

regularly drove the car, had it parked outside his residence, and,
unlike the defendants in State v. Valdez and State v. Constantino,
claimed a proprietary and possessory interest in the van and in the
shotgun.
Professor Lafave suggests other reasons for granting
Mr. Grueber standing on these facts.

Professor Lafave states:

Unquestionably, a spouse of the person with the
possessory interest also has standing as to the
premises if that spouse also resides there, as do
offspring who likewise make those premises their
home.
Lafave, Search and Seizure, 511.3(a) at 285 (footnotes omitted).
later states:
Just as family members living with the owner or
tenant of premises share with him an expectation
of privacy in that residence, it would seem that
they likewise share a protected privacy interest
in vehicles used by the family. As explained in
In re J.R.M., [487 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. 1972)], holding
a 16-year-old son living at home had standing to
object to the search of a car frequently used by
him but owned by his father and parked in a space
rented by his father at the time of its seizure:
If the search had been of the house in
which appellant lived with his parents and
officers had seized evidence against appellant
from the bathroom used by him and others, it
seems clear, under the Supreme Court decisions,
that he would have standing to object to
evidence obtained by an unauthorized search,
even though he was not present when the search
occurred. The question then becomes one of
whether he must show more to establish standing
as to the search of the Corvair than he would
have been required to do in the case of a
- 16 -

He

search of the bathroom in the house where he
lived. . . . We perceive no reason for a
different approach or test where the search is
of an automobile . . .
If we should deny standing to appellant
herein under the factual situation that
existed, we logically also would be required to
deny standing to the wife of the owner of an
automobile who had no title thereto but who
used the car regularly, as did the appellant
here.
Id. at §11.3(e) at 335 (footnotes omitted).

The trial court

accordingly erred in finding no standing.
With standing now assumed, Mr. Grueber also claims error
in the Court's determination that he abandoned the property when he
ran (or walked) away from the van.

This ruling is erroneous.

As

Mr. Grueber was not under arrest and did not hear a command to stop,
he had every right to avoid talking with the officer.

Brown v.

Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88
(Utah App. 1987).
of this case.

The theory of abandonment does not fit the facts

Abandonment requires more; it requires a

demonstration of intent to abandon.

United States v. Jones, 707

P.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983).
It cannot be seriously contended that every time an
individual parks his or her automobile on the street or in the
driveway that he or she has abandoned his or her rights to the car
or its contents.

This Court must not tolerate such an expansive

stretch with the theory of abandonment.
Finally, there is no other justification to allow
admission of the shotgun.

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.

443, 466 (1971), the United States Supreme Court stressed that
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seized items must be readily and immediately apparent as fruits,
instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime.

In a very recent case,

the Court has been even more demanding, requiring an officer who is
lawfully present to get a warrant before he may move an object in
plain view even a few inches in order to expose the serial number of
the item he believes to be evidence of a crime.
480 U.S.

, 94 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1987).

Arizona v. Hicks,

Accord, State v.

Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985).
Utah law concurs.

Both State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207,

210-11 (Utah 1985), and State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah
1983), have held that evidence seized under the plain view exception
to the warrant requirement, as done in the instant case, must be
clearly incriminating.

This "clearly incriminating11 requirement

mandates that officers have probable cause to believe the property
seized is tied to criminal activity.
210.

State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d at

Notably, there is nothing about carrying a gun in Utah that

connotes criminality.

In fact, Utah law expressly provides that

individuals within this State may carry firearms in any vehicle with
impunity so long as the firearm is not loaded.
§76-10-504(2) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

The gun found by Officer Robinson

was not loaded and was therefore within the framework of the statute
and lawfully present in the van.
Furthermore, Officer Robinson could not articulate a sound
basis for seizing the shotgun.

His justifications for seizing the

shotgun—that it could have been stolen or could have been used in a
previous crime—were both unfounded speculation lacking the
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requisite probable cause to permit seizure.

The Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States constitution and
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution require much more
basis than that utilized by the officer in this case.

Both

constitutions were violated demanding that the shotgun be suppressed.
Because the trial court erroneously denied the motion to
suppress, Mr. Grueber was prejudiced.

As the State conceded in

closing argument:
The only thing that's necessary is to show that a
deadly weapon, which State's Exhibit 1 clearly is,
was used, and that it is capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury (R. 130 at 146).
With the shotgun properly suppressed, the State could not have
established a convincing case.
As the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to
suppress, this Court should correct that error.

The Court should

reverse the conviction of Mr. Grueber and remand the case to the
District Court with instructions to conduct a new trial without the
improperly seized evidence or dismiss the charges.
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